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FEDERALISM VS. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSIVE
PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
A potential hardship facing citizens of federal states is the
possible application of two sets of penal laws to the same con-
duct.' Within the federal systems of the United States and Can-
ada, an individual accused of committing an act that concur-
rently violates both state and federal law may be subjected to
successive prosecutions by each government.2 This injustice is
unique to a federal system because of the concept of dual sov-
ereignty.' It is the independent regulatory control of each gov-
ernment comprising a dual sovereignty system that results in po-
tential multiple prosecutions.
Australia has a federal system similar to that of the United
States and Canada.4 However, the Australian system protects
the defendant from facing a second prosecution by affording
him the opportunity to utilize the common law evidentiary pleas
of autrefois acquit5 and autrefois convict.6 These pleas serve to
1. Friedland, Double Jeopardy and the Division of Legislative Authority in
Canada, 17 U. TORONTO L.J. 66 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Friedland].
2. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Rex v. Kissick, 78
Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 34 (1942).
3. The concept of dual sovereignty, in essence, states that every citizen of
the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory, that he owes allegiance
to two sovereignties, and that he may be punished for a single act which violates
the laws of both sovereignties. The clearest formulation of this doctrine can be
found in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); and in Moore v. Illinois,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
The general rule regarding the issue of double jeopardy when the state and
federal governments have concurrent jurisdiction or "dual sovereignty" is sum-
marized in 21 AM. JUR. 2d, Criminal Law § 192 (1965) as follows:
The same act may constitute a violation of both federal and state laws,
and it has been held that a conviction or acquittal in one jurisdiction
will not prevent a subsequent prosecution in the other if the case is one
over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.
(footnotes omitted).
4. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law
and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rpv. 1 (1956-57) [hereinafter
cited as Grant].
5. The name of a plea in bar to a criminal action, stating that the defend-
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bar a subsequent indictment on the grounds that the defendant
has previously been acquitted or convicted of the same offense.
Consequently, Australian citizens are not subjected to the dangers
of successive prosecutions by the state and commonwealth gov-
ernments.
The utilization of these pleas ameliorates the injustice in-
herent in allowing a defendant to be tried twice for the same of-
fense. 7  By focusing upon the United States, Canadian and
Australian systems, it shall become apparent that the Australian
system exemplifies an approach whereby the rights of the de-
fendant are meaningfully safeguarded while the interests of the
two sovereignties are adequately represented. It will be the pur-
pose of this comment to illustrate the necessity of the adoption of
the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict in the United
States and Canada.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE UNITED STATES
The prohibition against double jeopardy was brought to the
United States by the early colonists. 8 It appeared in constitutions
and declarations of rights as early as 1681,1 and was codified by
Blackstone in his Commentaries.1" Notwithstanding this prohi-
bition, the Supreme Court, in three major decisions," upheld the
ant has been once already indicted and tried for the same alleged offense and has
been acquitted. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (4th ed. 1968).
6. The name of a plea in bar to an indictment that he has been formally
convicted of the same crime. Id.
7. For a discussion of what is the "same offense," see Comment, Double
Jeopardy-Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L. REV. 87 (1971-72).
8. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 385 (1959). See
Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 n.1 (1965-66). The double jeop-
ardy principle existed during the Greek and Roman eras. Canon law contained
a similar principle. There is evidence that a plea similar to double jeopardy may
have appeared in English law as early as the fourteenth century, but the earliest
conclusive evidence of the principle appears in the writings of Hale and Coke
(seventeenth century), and later in Blackstone (eighteenth century). See also J.
Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 283-97 (1963).
9. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 385 (1959).
10. The plea of autrefois acquit, or a formal acquittal, is grounded on the
universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES BOOK IV (1759 ed.). See SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 16 (1969).
11. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410
(1847); see also Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM.
L. REV. 1309, 1314 n.27 (1932).
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constitutionality of concurrent state and federal criminal jurisdic-
tion. 2 The Court did not confront the question of successive
trials, but did address the issue of the necessity of concurrency
by reasoning that concurrent jurisdiction did not involve a power
struggle between the state and federal governments, but rather
that it protected citizens from the arbitrary control of one sov-
ereignty." The Court held that since each citizen owed alle-
giance to both sovereignties, he could be punished by both. 4
The doctrine was not established without severe opposition within the
Court itself. In the Fox and Moore cases, Mr. Justice McLean wrote
a ringing dissent. Reasoning that neither government could be required
to accept a plea in bar based upon a previous prosecution in the courts
of the other, he continued: "Nothing can be more repugnant or contra-
dictory than two punishments for the same act. It would be a mockery
of justice, . . . a reproach to civilization, [and] would violate not only
the common principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the na-
ture of both governments. . . . It follows that the power to punish be-
ing in the general government, it does not exist in the states."
(footnotes omitted).
12. Accord, State v. Antonio, 3 S.C. (3 Brev.) 562, 578 (1816); where the
majority held that the state law punishing the counterfeiting of foreign coins was
still in force, notwithstanding the passage of a national law on the same subject.
13. "It has more accurately been shown that the men who wrote the Consti-
tution as well as the citizens of the member States of the Confederation were fear-
ful of the power of centralized government and sought to limit its power." Bart-
kus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959). See also Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926).
14. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), where the same act
was an offense against the state of Washington, because a violation of its law,
and was also an offense against the United States under the National Prohibition
Act. The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same act, and
a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that state is not a
conviction of the different offense against the United States, and is therefore not
subject to double jeopardy. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S.
256 (1927).
The consideration of policy which may have grounded the Lanza decision is
articulated in a ruling of the West Virginia Supreme Court. The court reasoned
that it would deprive each separate government of one of the essentials of sover-
eignty to hold that it was powerless to punish an offender for violating its law
simply because the wrongful act committed also constituted an offense against an-
other sovereignty. State v. Henson, 91 W. Va. 701, 114 S.E. 273 (1922).
This contention is not unanswerable.. By very definition, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to restrict sovereignty through placing limitations upon an other-
wise legally omnipotent government. It appears that the court assumes "sover-
eignty" to rest in the government, rather than in the people.
See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS REASONINGS 76 (1964) quoted
in Note, Multiple Prosecution: Federalism vs. Individual Rights, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 355, 363 (1967-68) [hereinafter cited as Multiple Prosecution].
The importance of the federalism argument makes it necessary to
examine some of the hypotheses upon which it is based. The concept
of crime against the sovereign is traceable partly to the work of John
Austin. To Austin, law was a set of commands issued by a sovereign
3
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This analysis indicates that a violation of national and state
law results in commission of distinct crimes in two separate juris-
dictions, thus giving both governments the right to prosecute.
Several modern decisions of the United States Supreme
Court pertain to the concept of dual sovereignty. The two most
notable cases are Bartkus v. Illinois,'5 and Abbate v. United
States. 6 In consecutively reported decisions, the Court upheld
successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments for
crimes arising from the same conduct. 7
In Bartkus, the defendant was tried in a federal district court
for the robbery of a federally insured savings and loan associa-
tion located in the state of Illinois." s Subsequent to an acquittal
in the federal district court, he was indicted by the state grand
jury for an offense 9 consisting of the samel alleged conduct.
20
Bartkus was tried,2 convicted, 2  and sentenced to life imprison-
ment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute.23 On appeal,
for the violation of which definite penalties, or sanctions, were pre-
scribed. Austin's sovereign was that individual or group of individuals
to whom the larger part of society habitually gave obedience and who,
at the same time, was not subject to the dictates of any other higher
authority. Disobedience was therefore a personal transgression against
another person-the sovereign.
Id. at 363.
15. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
16. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
17. For purposes of this comment, it is assumed that the "identical offense"
requirement is met.
18. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The United States prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970):
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes . . .
property . . . in the care, custody, control, management, or possession
of. .. any savings and loan association;
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
19. The Illinois proceeding was brought pursuant to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 501 (1951).
20. The Illinois grand jury came to a completely opposite conclusion than
did the federal courts. The confusion is compounded by the similarity of the evi-
dence in the two cases.
21. People v. Bartkus, 7 III. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955).
22. The Illinois trial court considered and rejected petitioner's plea of autre-
fois acquit. See also United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (1884), cited in Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134 (1959), where the Oregon Circuit Court was pre-
sented with a case just the opposite of Bartkus. The prior trial and acquittal was
by a state court; the subsequent trial was by a federal court. The circuit court
rejected defendant's plea of autrefois acquit, saying that the hardship of the second
trial might operate to persuade against the bringing of a subsequent prosecution
but could not bar it.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 603 (1951). The State of Illinois had a spe-
Vol. 5
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the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and the case
was petitioned to the United States Supreme Court. 4
In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed Bartkus" conviction.2 5
The decision was based upon two principles: that the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 26 was not binding upon
the states;27 and, that the concept of dual sovereignty compels
the maintenance of both a strong state and federal system of
justice.25
In his majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter emphasized that
the state prosecution was not a sham and a cover for a federal
prosecution, and concluded that they were separately conducted.
29
cial interest in the defendant beyond the commission of a particular crime. Find-
ing Bartkus guilty as charged made him an habitual offender under Illinois law
and thereby subjected him to life imprisonment. Thus, the Illinois court felt that
a rule barring successive federal-state prosecutions could work to defeat the inter-
est of sovereignties in implementing effective law enforcement policies.
24. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision by an equally
divided court. Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1958). The court subsequently
granted a rehearing and revoked the earlier judgment. Bartkus v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 969 (1958).
25. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
26. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No
person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.... .U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959). This had been decided
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
28. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM at 74 (1968).
29. Although Frankfurter concluded that the two prosecutions were sep-
arately conducted, he did offer the following:
It is true that the agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who con-
ducted the investigation on behalf of the Federal Government turned
over to the Illinois prosecuting officials all the evidence he had gathered
against the petitioner. Concededly, some of that evidence had been
gathered after acquittal in the federal court.
The only other connection between the two trials is to be found in
a suggestion that the federal sentencing of the accomplices who testified
against petitioner in both trials was purposely continued by the federal
court until after they testified in the state trial.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1959).
Note that Justice Brennan dissented in Bartkus for a different reason than
did Justice Black. Brennan dissented because of the federal interference in the
state trial. It would appear that he agreed with Frankfurter's analysis of dual
sovereignty, because he wrote the majority opinion in Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187 (1959). In the dissent in Bartkus, Brennan wrote:
It is clear that federal officers solicited the state indictment, arranged
to assure the attendance of key witnesses, unearthed additional evidence
to discredit Bartkus and one of his alibi witnesses, and in general pre-
pared and guided the state prosecution. Thus the State's Attorney stated
at the state trial: "I am particularly glad to see a case where the fed-
eral authorities came to see the state's attorney." And Illinois conceded
with commendable candor on the oral argument in this Court "that the
federal officers did instigate and guide this state prosecution" and "actu-
ally prepared this case."
1975
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Therefore, by finding that the federal prosecution had no rela-
tionship to the state prosecution, the Court excused the applica-
tion of the double jeopardy clause.
In further support of the majority position, the Court re-
lied on the precedent set in the landmark case of Palko v. Con-
necticut.3" In Palko, Justice Cardozo conceived of a new
standard to determine which rights under the first ten amend-
ments of the United States Constitution were applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.31 The test applied was whether or not a deprivation of
the fundamental right in question violated "the concept of or-
dered liberty. ' 3 2  Frankfurter applied this test in Bartkus, and
concluded that the "concept of ordered liberty" was not violated
by a successive multi-governmental prosecution. He also ana-
lyzed the effects that multiple prosecutions have on the state gov-
ernment:
It would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the
historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace
and order within their confines. It would be in derogation
of our federal system to displace the reserved power of
States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor
federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of
the States.33
This statement suggests that if successive prosecutions were
disallowed, the result would be a federal pre-emption of state's
rights. As this is inconsistent with the concept of dual sovereignty,
the Court could not countenance such a result. A better under-
standing of this holding may be reached by analyzing a theory
of jurisdiction. 4 Historically, countries implementing the com-
I think that the record before us shows that the extent of partici-
pation of the federal authorities here constituted this state prosecution
actually a second federal prosecution of Bartkus.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 165-66 (1959).
30. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); the Court held that the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment was not incorporated into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
31. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
33. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
34. Continental countries based their concept of jurisdiction upon the social
dangers involved in allowing multi-jurisdictional prosecutions. See Grant, supra
Vol. 5
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/7
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS
mon law have stressed the locus of the act in determining proper
jurisdiction. 5 Frankfurter's analysis is consistent with this theory.
Since Bartkus' act occurred within the boundaries of two gov-
ernments, or "in two places," it follows that both governments
should have a legal right to prosecute.
The legality of successive prosecutions by two governments
was re-examined in Abbate v. United States.38 Abbate was con-
victed in an Illinois state court of conspiracy to damage prop-
erty.317 He was subsequently indicted and convicted in a federal
court for a violation stemming from the same conspiracy.
3 8
Abbate appealed the federal conviction to the United States
Supreme Court and it was affirmed.3" The question presented
was whether or not the prosecution by the federal government
violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The
issue and the facts differ slightly from the Bartkus case. In
Bartkus, the state government conducted the second prosecution,
while in Abbate, the federal government conducted the second
prosecution." Since the second trial was a federal prosecution,
the fifth amendment was directly involved. The Supreme Court
held that the fifth amendment was applicable, but it had not
note 11 at 1317 n.40 wherein he writes:
In Scotland, which follows the civil law, a criminal charge recites
that the accused "ought to be punished with the pains of the law in order
to deter others from committing the like crimes in all time coming."
Note what a different mental reaction is called for by such a statement
than by an indictment charging that the accused has violated "the peace
and dignity of the United States of America."
35. See authorities cited note 11, supra. Locus refers to the place where a
thing is done. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090 (4th ed. 1968).
36. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
37. Id.; Abbate was prosecuted pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 139
(1957).
38. The federal prosecution was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970)
which provides:
If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the
United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970) provides:
Whoever wilfully or maliciously injures or destroys any of the works,
property, or material of any. . . telephone or cable, line, station or sys-
tem, or other means of communication, operated or controlled by the
United States . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
39. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
40. If one were prosecuted first by the federal government and then by the
state government, Bartkus would be dispositive, regardless of whether the first
prosecution resulted in conviction or acquittal. If one were prosecuted first by
the state government and then by the federal government, Abbate would control.
,1975
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been violated since the prosecutions were by two independent
governments. 4
Once again the Supreme Court emphasized the locus of the
act by analyzing the problem in terms of the legal right of each
government to enforce their penal laws. The Court found:
[I]f the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating
their laws, and the resultant state prosecutions bar federal
prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law enforce-
ment must necessarily be hindered. For example, the peti-
tioners in this case insist that their Illinois convictions result-
ing in three months' prison sentences should bar this federal
prosecution which could result in a sentence up to five years.
Such a disparity will very often arise when, as in this case,
the defendants' acts impinge more seriously on a federal in-
terest than on a state interest.
42
This statement and' Frankfurter's statement in Bartkus have a
similar impact. In Bartkus, the court suggested that the preven-
tion of successive prosecutions could result in federal pre-emption
of a state right. In Abbate, the court suggests that disallowing
successive prosecutions would result in state pre-emption of a fed-
eral right. Neither result was felt to be tolerable. Thus, the dual
sovereignty rationale for successive prosecutions currently re-
mains predicated on two presumptions. First, the state judicial
system should remain strong. Second, the states must not be al-
lowed to prevent the effective administration of federal laws by
being the first jurisdiction to prosecute an individual for a crime
cognizable by both jurisdictions, prosecuting for a relatively mi-
nor state offense, and precluding the federal government from
prosecuting the individual for what may be a much more serious
federal offense.43
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed and re-
tested the established dual sovereignty and double jeopardy
standards in several cases since Bartkus and Abbate.41 In Ben-
41. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193 (1959).
42. Id. at 195.
43. See, e.g., Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments:
Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1538 (1966-67).
44. See, e.g., Hill v. Beto, 390 F.2d 640 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1007 (1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 840 (1970); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1969); Bankston v. State, 236 S.2d 757 (Miss. 1970). Contra, State
v. Fletcher, 15 Ohio Misc. 336, 240 N.E.2d 905 (1968). Fletcher proceeded to
evaluate the validity of Bartkus after Benton and concluded:
Tlime and circumstance have so eroded the Bartkus decision, that the
Vol. 5
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ton v. Maryland,45 the defendant was indicted in a Maryland
state court on burglary and larceny charges. He was convicted of
the burglary charge and acquitted of the larceny charge. Due
to a procedural error in the lower court,4 6 Benton was subse-
quently reindicted and retried in the state court on both charges.
The judge denied Benton's motion to dismiss the larceny charge
despite his objection that a retrial following an acquittal was vio-
lative of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 47
Benton was convicted of both charges. s
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
larceny conviction. The decision was predicated upon finding
that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth amendment was ap-
plicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 49  Thus, Benton prohibits the state from sub-
jecting a defendant to successive state prosecutions.
The facts in Benton are distinguishable from those in Bart-
kus where a successive federal-state prosecution occurred.50 In
Benton, both trials were conducted by the same government,
case is no longer a binding authority upon this court, that its dissenting
opinions represent the current constitutional philosophy of a majority of
the United States Supreme Court ....
Accordingly . . . the plea of former jeopardy . . . is well taken
Id. at 907.
In conclusion, the Court held that state and federal constitutions prohibited
a state prosecution of a defendant who had previously been placed in federal jeop-
ardy for the same act.
45. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
46. After his notice of appeal was filed, the Maryland Court of Appeals de-
clared invalid a provision of the Maryland Constitution which required grand and
petit jurors to declare their beliefs in the existence of God. See Schowgurow v.
State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965). As a result of this decision, the Court
of Appeals remanded petitioner's case to the trial court, where he chose not to
accept the conviction and requested a new trial.
47. Maryland was one of five states whose constitution did not prohibit plac-
ing an accused in jeopardy more than once for the same offense. See LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGEST TO STATE
CoNSTruTIONS at 576 (2d ed. 1959). However, Maryland had recognized the
prohibition against double jeopardy as part of their common law in some in-
stances. See Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 A. 354 (1923).
48. Benton was given concurrent sentences of fifteen years on the burglary
charge and five years on the larceny charge. On appeal, the Maryland court of
special appeals rejected petitioner's double jeopardy claim, Benton v. State, 1 Md.
App. 647, 232 A.2d 541 (1967); and the Maryland court of appeals denied dis-
cretionary review.
49. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
50. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1969).
1975
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whereas in Bartkus, the prosecutions were conducted by two in-
dependent governments. Nevertheless, the Benton decision casts
considerable doubt upon the strength of the Bartkus decision. In
Bartkus, Justice Frankfurter did not view double jeopardy as be-
ing directly in issue since the prosecutions were not consecutively
conducted by the federal government, and the Palko standard in-
volving the concept of ordered liberty was not violated. However,
the Court might hold differently if Bartkus was decided today
because Benton v. Maryland overruled Palko v. Connecticut.5
Therefore, one of the two principles upon which the Bartkus de-
cision was based is now obsolete. The Court, in overruling
Palko, stated:
Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights
which this Court's recent decisions have rejected ... i.e.,
that basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States
as long as the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a
denial of "fundamental fairness."
'52
The above discussion reveals some deterioration in the nar-
row interpretation of the double jeopardy clause. The court's
position in Benton resembles that taken by Justice Black's dissent
in Bartkus.53 Black analyzed the problem of successive prose-
cutions by two governments under an incorporation theory, and
under the Palko standard.54 His vigorous dissent analyzed the
situation from the viewpoint of a criminal defendant rather than
from the viewpoint of maintaining a state's prerogatives:
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial
for the same act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials
is conducted by the Federal Government and the other by a
51. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
52. Id. at 794-95.
53. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting),
where the history and rationale of the double jeopardy clause, the effect of suc-
cessive prosecutions on the accused, and the common law approach to double
jeopardy in a multi-jurisdictional context are discussed. See also State v. Fletcher,
15 Ohio Misc. 336, 240 N.E.2d 905, 907 (1968); where the lower court referred
to Bartkus as an "historic pile of rubble" and predicted its reversal. Black further
suggested that the rule fails because it assumes that the state and federal govern-
ments will, whenever possible, seek to subvert the other by trying to impede the
functioning of the other's law enforcement agencies.
54. Palko held that the double jeopardy clause was not binding upon the
states, but certain aspects of that protection which are basic to our notion of due
process bind the state governments. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Vol. 5
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State. Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who
is being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp. a '
To properly understand the rationale underlying the deci-
sions upholding successive prosecutions, one must consider that
state and federal laws may reflect different policies. The penal
laws of each sovereignty serve to protect disparate interests of
two separate and distinct governments. However, this does not
justify successive prosecutions. State and federal laws frequently
complement each other so that a prosecution by one government
would seem to vindicate the interests of both. 6 This view has been
adopted in several instances. Soon after the Bartkus decision, Illi-
nois provided a statutory double jeopardy defense for any person
prosecuted in an Illinois state court after being tried in a federal
court for the same offense.17  Another example is found in the
Model Penal Code which bars a second prosecution in another
jurisdiction when the offenses are identical, require the same proof,
and arise from the same criminal transaction.58 Further, the
Attorney General of the United States has announced a policy of
limited multiple prosecutions:
After a state prosecution, there should be no federal
trial for the same act . . . unless the reasons are compelling.
We should continue to make every effort to cooperate with
state and local authorities to the end that the trial occur in
the jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the pub-
55. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959), where Justice Black
captured the inherent weakness of the majority position:
It is just as much an affront to human dignity and just as dangerous
to human freedom for a man to be punished twice for same offense, once
by a State and once by the United States, as it would be for one of these
two Governments to throw him in prison twice for the offense.
56. For example, both statutes which Bartkus allegedly violated regulated
robbery.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 601(1) (1959).
58. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10(1)(a)(b) (Proposed Official Draft
1962):
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of this State and of the United States or another State, a prosecu-
tion in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution
in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a con-
viction . . . and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same
conduct, unless (a) the offense of which the defendant was for-
merly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is sub-
sequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by
the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to
prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (b) the second of-
fense was not consummated when the former trial began . ...
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lic interest is best served. If this be determined accurately,
and is followed by efficient and intelligent cooperation by
state and federal law enforcement authorities, the consider-
ation of a second prosecution very seldom should arise. 59
United States Attorneys are now required to seek permission be-
fore proceeding to trial subsequent to a state trial for the same
offense. 60  If closely adhered to, this regulation may reduce the
number of successively prosecuted cases.
The lower federal courts and the state courts have generally
continued to permit successive trials, 6 ' despite apparent indica-
tions from the United States Supreme Court that Bartkus and
Abbate have waning constitutional validity.62 A principle reason
for allowing both trials is to give each government an opportu-
nity to represent its separate interests. Once more, the locus of
the act is emphasized.6 3  It would appear that an individual's
double jeopardy protection is subservient to the governmental in-
terest in maintaining a strong system of law enforcement.
Although the lower federal courts and state courts adhere to
the holdings in Bartkus and Abbate, they apparently recognize
the harsh results that they inflict upon the defendant. In Cullen v.
Ceci,64 the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed the precedent set in
59. Statement of Attorney General William P. Rogers, Press Release, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1959, at 1, col. 4.
60. Former Attorney General William P. Rogers stated:
No federal case should be tried when there has already been a state pros-
ecution for substantially the same act or acts without the United States
Attorney first submitting a recommendation to the Assistant Attorney
General in the department. No such recommendation should be
proved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
division without having it first brought to [the Attorney General's] at-
tention.
Quoted in 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (U.S. Apr. 7, 1959).
Nevertheless, no legal barriers exist to prevent a second prosecution by the
federal government. Moreover, the Attorney General's statement has no effect
upon prosecution by a State following a federal conviction or acquittal. See
Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REV. 607 (1966); Multiple
Prosecution, supra note 14, at 358.
61. See, e.g., Hill v. Beto, 390 F.2d 640 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1007 (1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 840 (1970); Caton v. United States, 407 F.2d 367
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984 (1969); Broyhill v. Morris, 408 F.2d 820
(4th Cir. 1969); Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Brant,
Overruling Bartkus and Abbate: A New Standard for Double Jeopardy, 11
WASH. L.J. 188, 201 (1971-72).
62. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
63. For further discussion, see Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties,
and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 591 (1960-61).
64. 45 Wise. 2d 432, 173 N.W.2d 175 (1970).
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Bartkus. However, the court was sympathetic to the defendant's
position, and evidenced a deep concern for the rights of the de-
fendant.
Cullen urges that he ought not be punished or threatened
with punishment by both the state of Wisconsin and the
United States for a single act. The argument, although as-
serted only obliquely, is a powerful one, and carries with it
the appealing argument that it is fundamentally unfair to
punish a man twice for a single act. We can only say that
our law has not yet concluded that punishment by separate
sovereignties for the same act constitutes double jeopardy. 65
Cullen exemplifies the struggle that lower federal courts and
state courts are currently facing. The courts must respect and
abide by the United States Supreme Court decision in Bartkus.
However, by doing so, the defendant is subjected to the harsh-
ness of a double prosecution. It would appear that the courts
eschew considerations of the combined effects of state and fed-
eral action on the defendant in exchange for preserving the name
of federalism. The federal system should not demand such re-
sults. The majority opinion in Bartkus quotes Justice Brandeis
as saying that the separation of powers was adopted in the Con-
stitution "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise
of arbitrary power."66 Successive prosecutions by two independ-
ent sovereignties do not prevent arbitrariness, for one government
does not serve to "check" or "balance" the other. Rather, after
the first trial is concluded, the remaining government may arbi-
trarily elect to prosecute.
It is doubtful that the framers of the Constitution intended
to overemphasize institutional interests when they drafted the fifth
amendment. Perhaps they had some very practical considerations
in mind. For example, defendants have a constitutional right
"not to be harassed or perhaps even impoverished by successive
prosecutions for the same offense."6 7  It would seem that guilt
or innocence should be established by proving the elements of a
crime to the satisfaction of a single jury. Counsel for Bartkus
addressed this issue:
If we are dissatisfied with -the verdict of a jury in the
state court, would it be a sound remedy, even if constitution-
65. Id. at 187.
66. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
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ally possible, to call a jury in the federal court of the local-
ity in order to have a second crack at the accused? Would
that, in the long run, promote respect for our principles and
our courts? We submit that it would not. Far from being a
practical though unprincipled necessity for law enforce-
ment, duplicate prosecutions are as unnecessary as they are
unprincipled.68
By respecting the judgment of a single judge or jury, a defend-
ant upon acquittal could resume his role in society knowing that
the decision is final.69 Each of these considerations applies
equally to successive multi-governmental prosecutions and to suc-
cessive prosecutions by the same government.
In view of the legal and practical considerations involved,
there appears to be an erosion of the foundations upon which the
dual sovereignty concept rests.7" However, despite the erosion, the
United States continues to permit the state and federal govern-
ments to do jointly that which neither can do alone: namely, to
reprosecute in furtherance of obtaining a conviction."'
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN CANADA
The policy considerations in support of the American rule
permitting consecutive state and federal prosecutions are not rec-
ognized in Canada.72 The structure for the administration of
criminal justice in Canada differs considerably from that in the
United States.73 In the United States, the federal government and
68. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
69. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 792-94 (1969).
70. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Cornm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
(1964); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
71. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black J., dis-
senting). "I am also not convinced that a State and the Nation can be considered
two wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to do together
what, generally, neither can do separately."
72. See Friedland, supra note 1; Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the
State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1924-25).
73. As one scholar writes
Whereas our United States Congress has chosen to vest exclusive
jurisdiction over most federal crimes in a separate system of federal
courts, and to restrict the trial of state crimes in federal courts to a small
but increasing number of cases, the Parliament of Canada, with few ex-
ceptions, has vested all Dominion jurisdiction in the regularly established
provincial courts. Since the provinces tend to pattern their procedures
for the prosecution of provincial crimes after the Dominion's code sec-
tions on summary convictions, often the procedure and generally the
courts concerned will be the same whether one is charged with violating
a Dominion or a provincial law. But there are many exceptions, espe-
cially as to the right to jury trial.
Grant, supra note 4, at 17.
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the individual state governments have their own penal laws, their
own law enforcement agencies, and their own court systems. In
Canada, there is only one system of criminal courts and only one
body, the province, charged with administering the criminal law.
74
It would appear that Canadian criminal defendants would not
face the threat of successive prosecutions. However, a Cana-
dian citizen is subject to the same danger of facing multiple trials
as is an American citizen.
The problem stems from the fact that the federal govern-
ment and the provincial governments concurrently regulate the
same criminal activity. Historically, the federal government had
complete control over penal legislation. However, exclusive leg-
islative authority was soon discovered to be unworkable. As one
court pointed out, "Matters which from one point of view and
for one purpose, fall exclusively within the dominion authority,
may, nevertheless be proper subjects for legislation by the prov-
ince from a different point of view. . . .-7' Thus, to insure ade-
quate representation of their disparate interests, the Canadian
provinces and the federal government have concurrently passed
penal legislation.76
The two governments are granted the power to regulate the
criminal law by the British North America Act (B.N.A.).77  Sec-
tion 91(27) of the B.N.A. confers upon the federal government
exclusive ". . . legislative authority over The Criminal Law . . .
including the Procedure in Criminal Matters."7 8  The primary
74. Friedland, supra note 1.
75. Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396, 401.
76. Several decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court have upheld the valid-
ity of provincial legislation in spite of the existence of federal laws covering sim-
ilar activity. See O'Grady v. Sparling, 128 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 1 (1960);
Stephens v. The Queen, 128 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 21 (1960); Smith v. The
Queen, 128 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 145 (1960). See also Mann v. The Queen,
[1966] S.C.R. 238.
77. The British North America Act (1867).
78. Id. § 91(27). For a constitutional analysis of the criminal law power,
see LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1960); LEFROY, CANADA'S
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1913). See, e.g., A.G. for Ont. v. Hamilton St. Ry., [1903]
A.C. 524 (Can.); Johnson v. A.G. for Alta., [1954] 2 D.L.R. 625; Switzman v.
Elbing, [1957] 1 D.L.R. 473; see also Friedland, supra note 1. The main reason
for so assigning the criminal law power was expressed as follows by a Chief Jus-
tice of Ontario shortly after Confederation:
It is important that the law of a country as to crime and criminal pro-
cedure shall be uniform, so that the rights of all citizens shall be, as
much as possible, equally respected, and the public wrongs of any citi-
zen, as much as possible, equally punished.
Friedland, supra note I at 66.
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reason for allocating this authority to the federal government was
to establish a uniformity of procedure so that regardless of pro-
vincial habitancy, the rights of each citizen would be adequately
protected. To enforce the penal laws, section 92(15) grants
the provinces exclusive authority to provide for "the imposition
of punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment."79
Canadian dual sovereignty is thus based upon a system of
coordinate governments. The essence of dual sovereignty is pres-
ent since each government enjoys a sovereign power within its
own field of legislative competency with neither being subordi-
nate to the other." Therefore, the potential overlap of penal
laws is inherent within the British North America Act, and succes-
sive prosecutions by the dominion and provincial governments are
a distinct possibility.
Early Canadian case law dealing with the relationship be-
tween federal and provincial offenses suggests that there are no
restrictions on successive prosecutions by the two sovereignties. 8
In one instance, counsel for the province of Ontario discussed the
problem:
The jurisdiction of the Provinces arid the Dominion over-
lap. The Dominion can declare anything a crime but this
only so as not -to interfere with or exclude the powers of the
Province .. .so that though the result might be an incon-
venient exposure to double liability, that possibility is no ar-
gument against the right to exercise that power.8 2
This statement would appear to correctly state the Canadian law
and has since been widely quoted. 3
This position was applied in Forques v. Gauvin.s4 Gauvin
was prosecuted by the provincial government of Quebec. The
79. The British North America Act § 92(15) (1867).
80. See Rex v. Arcadia Coal Co. Ltd., 26 Alta. 348 (App. Div. 1932).
81. Friedland, supra note 1, at 73. See, e.g., Couture v. Lauzon School
Comm'rs., 97 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 218 (1950); Rex v. Kissick, 78 Can. Crim.
Cas. Ann. 34 (1942); Lohse v. Taylor, 37 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 123 (1922).
Contra, Dickie, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 757, 768.
82. Wason, 17 Ont. 221, 225 (1890).
83. See, e.g., Scott, 37 Ont. L.R. 453, 456 (1916); Couture v. Lauzon
School Comm'rs., 97 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 218, 236 (1950); Rex v. Kissick, 78
Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 34, 40 (1942); Lohse v. Taylor, 37 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann.
123, 126 (1922). See also CLEMENT, CANADIAN CONSTITUION 567 et seq.
(3d ed. 1916). But cf. Egbert J. in Dickie, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 757, 768 (Atla.)
who felt that Blake's statement is "a quite incorrect statement of the law."
84. 30 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 302 (1919).
ol. 5
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/7
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS
action was dismissed because of errors in pleading. Instead of
correcting these errors, a new action was brought by the federal
government. The defendant plead autrejois acquit, but the plea
was rejected. The federal court reasoned, "both the federal and
provincial governments have made an offence of a certain act, to
which they have attached a penalty; both have the right to sue
for that offense . . ."5 This reasoning is analogous to the rea-
soning used in the early American cases.8 6 By emphasizing the
locus of the act, the court permits a second prosecution. 7
Canadian cases involving successive prosecutions are often
upheld under the theory that each sovereignty has a right to pros-
ecute for a violation of its penal law. However, some cases ap-
pear to be based on the theory that the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion is not applicable to successive federal-provincial prosecu-
tions. Rex v. Kissick s is the leading case adopting this ap-
proach. Kissick was initially prosecuted by the federal govern-
ment for a violation of the Federal Excise Act. After federal acquit-
tal, he was subsequently convicted in a Manitoba provincial court
for possessing the same liquor in violation of a provincial act.
On appeal, the Court upheld the provincial conviction. The opin-
ion reflected the analysis of the American cases:
Here are two authorities, each acting within its own
jurisdiction, taking cognizance of the same facts, which vio-
late the law of each. It cannot be said that an acquittal or
conviction under one ousts the jurisdiction of the other or
expiates the offense against it. Jurisdiction is not to be held
to be exclusive according to the order of time in which
proceedings are commenced and concluded. The facts may
be the same, but the offense is against a different law of a
different origin. Each law was passed by its enacting author-
ity for its purpose within its own field. 89
It is evident that a violation of an overlapping penal law
may result in a multiple prosecution. This result would appear
to mar the Canadian system which allows overlapping penal leg-
islation. A defendant should not be subjected to the harsh result
85. Id. at 303-04.
86. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUm. L. REv.
1309 (1932).
87. See generally Lederman, The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Pro-
vincial Laws in Canada, 9 McGILL L.J. 185 (1962).
88. 78 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 34 (1942).
89. Id. at 43.
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of a successive prosecution in order to insure that each govern-
ment is adequately represented. Apparently, double jeopardy pro-
tection is non-existent if both governments are able to prosecute
for violations arising from the same act. Further, the need for
successive prosecutions in Canada seems minimal. Unlike the
situation in the United States, the court structure of Canada al-
lows the individual governments to be closely represented at one
trial regardless of which governmental body is prosecuting. In
Canada, the same prosecutor will normally handle both trials,
and because both. trials will probably take place in the same
court, there is little reason for doubting the quality of justice ad-
ministered at the former trial.
By continuing to allow overlapping penal legislation with-
out a pre-emption system or a double jeopardy prohibition, the
Canadian government does not protect its citizens from the sever-
ity of double prosecutions.
lt. DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN AUSTRALIA
The Australian federal system, composed of the common-
wealth and state governments, is modeled after the federal sys-
tems of the United States and Canada. 9° The Australian Consti-
tution of 1900 specifically enumerated the powers of the com-
monwealth;91 all others remained with the states. The common-
wealth was not granted the power to try criminal cases until the
adoption of of the Commonwealth Crimes Act in 1914. Neverthe-
less, the commonwealth prosecuted a select number of cases prior
to 1914.
In 1911, The High Court of Australia was faced with the is-
sue of successive prosecutions in Gould v. Sin On Lee. 92 The
defendant was convicted of possession of opium in violation of
the Commonwealth Customs Act. He had served only seven days
of his sentence when his conviction was set aside. The common-
wealth could not reprosecute the defendant for the same offense.
Subsequently, proceedings were brought under a state act, and the
defendant was convicted of the unlawful possession of opium. On
90. Grant, supra note 4, at 24.
91. "The word Commonwealth here ([e.g], in the preamble to the Constitu-
tion) means the whole of the people of Australia," or "the Commonwealth" can
simply mean the Federal Government. A.G. for Vict. v. The Commonwealth, 71
Commw. L.R. 237, 273 (1945).
92. 6 Queensl. 15 (1911).
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appeal, the Australian High Court held that since the offenses were
essentially the same, the commonwealth prosecution barred the
state prosecution. 9  It appears that "[w]hen concurrent powers
are exercised, the law of the Commonwealth is supreme and the
law of the State, on so much of a subject as is covered by a Com-
monwealth law... is... inoperative."94
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Australian Consti-
tution does not contain numerous safeguards against potential
misuse of the criminal justice system.95 Instead, the protections af-
forded an Australian citizen are quite limited. Those that do exist
are generally less comprehensive in character.96 Although only
limited safeguards exist, the constitutions of all Australian juris-
dictions presuppose fundamental common law doctrines. For
example, it remains an established common law rule that a
defendant cannot be tried twice for the same offense. 97  In im-
plementing this rule, an accused who had previously been con-
victed or acquitted of the same offense can enter an appropriate
plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.9" Before allowing
these pleas, the court must determine whether both offenses con-
tain the same elements. In essence, the facts constituting the first
crime must include the same requisite elements that are neces-
sary to justify a conviction for the second offense. Therefore,
the defendant can assert these pleas if the charges in the second
prosecution constitute those of which the defendant could have
been convicted in the initial prosecution. These pleas safeguard
the defendant from successive prosecutions and can be asserted
in a state or a federal prosecution.9
93. Id.
94. Ausm. CONST., § 303 (2d ed. Sydney).
95. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amends IV, V, XIV.
96. For example, -one safeguard is found in § 80 of the Australian Consti-
tution and provides that trial on indictment of any offense against the law of the
Commonwealth shall be by jury. The section adopts the basic language of Arti-
cle III, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States:
The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Common-
wealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the state
where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed
within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the
Parliament prescribes.
AUSTL. CONST. § 80 (2d ed. Sydney).
97. See 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF CROWN 86 (8th ed. 1824).
98. While this plea works to the advantage of the defendant, the burden of
proving that the conviction or acquittal is legally given is also upon the defendant.
99. Cases declarative of the common law contain most of the law as to what
constitutes a conviction or acquittal in bar of trial. Those cases have held that
1975
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In Australia, federal trials are conducted in the state and
territorial courts. To insure a uniformity of procedure between a
state and federal trial, the Commonwealth Judiciary Act specifies
that the laws of the state in which the trial is held shall apply
to the federal prosecution. There are also two provisions in the
Commonwealth Judiciary Act which regulate appeals by the pros-
ecution. Sections 76(1)100 and 76(2)101 authorize appeals from.
arrests of judgment, and section 77102 concerns appeals to the
High Court of Australia. These sections specifically restrict the
prosecution's method of appealing a judgment. The prosecutor
does not write the appeal; instead the "[c]ourt shall on the appli-
cation of counsel for the prosecution state a case for the consid-
eration of a higher court."' 0 3  Thus, the procedure more ap-
proximates an internal review than the re-argument and re-eval-
uation that is known in the appellate process of United States
courts. These procedural restrictions take on greater significance
if the appellate court rejects the applicability of the special pleas
of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.
The common law principles regarding double jeopardy, and
a conviction and bar to further trial does not result from: (1) a binding over,
Rex v. London Quarter Sessions Appeals Comm., [1948] 1 K.B. 670; (2) a con-
viction that has been reversed on appeal as erroneous in law, Rex v. Drury, 18
L.J.K.B. 189 (1849); (3) a discharge by a jury without a verdict being given,
Regina v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460 (1861); and (4) an acquittal by a court
that had no jurisdiction a bar to a subsequent trial, AusT. CONST. § 35, Regina
v. McLellan, 15 L.R. 426 (1894). However, an acquittal before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in a foreign country is such a bar. Rex v. Rothe, 1 Leach 134
(1775). See, e.g., United States v. Jakalski, 267 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960).
100. Commonwealth Juduiciary Act of 1903, § 76(1) as amended provides:
(1) When the court before which an accused person is convicted
on indictment for an offense against the laws of the Commonwealth ar-
rests judgment at the trial, the Court shall on the application of counsel
for the prosecution state a case for the consideration of a Full Court
of the High Court of the State in manner hereinafter provided.
101. Commonwealth Judiciary Act of 1903, § 76(2) as amended provides
"On the hearing of the case the Full Court may affirm or reverse the order ar-
resting judgment ...."
102. Commonwealth Judiciary Act of 1903, § 77 as amended provides:
Except. . .for appeals by accused and appeals in accordance with
section 76, and except in the case of error apparent on the face of the
proceedings, an appeal shall not without the special leave of the High
Court be brought to the High Court from a judgment or sentence pro-
nounced on the trial of a person charged with an indictable offence
against the laws of the Commonwealth.
103. Commonwealth Judiciary Act of 1903, §§ 68 and 79 as amended. Simi-
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sections 76(1)-(2) and 77 are protections afforded an accused
individual. The special pleas, the strongest protection offered to
-the defendant, have been expressly retained by statute in the
Crimes Acts of each Australian jurisdiction. A typical statute
would read:
In any plea of autrefois convict or of autrefois acquit, it shall
be sufficient for the accused to allege that he has been law-
fully convicted or acquitted, as the case may be, of the said
offence charged in the information, without specifying the
time or place of such previous conviction or acquittal.
104
The Australian code jurisdictions also contain double jeop-
ardy provisions which -are substantially similar to those in the
common law codes. 1°5  In addition to retaining the pleas of au-
trefois acquit and autrefois convict, most code jurisdictions have
a statute similar to the following:
It is a defence to a charge of 'any offence to show that the
accused person has already been tried, and convicted or ac-
quitted upon an indictment on which he might have been con-
victed of the offence with which he is charged, or has already
been acquitted upon indictment, or has already been con-
victed, of an offence of which he might be convicted upon
the indictment or complaint on which he is charged. 06
The combined effect of the Australian legislation is to cre-
ate substantial protection. The protective rights of the accused
are not only safeguarded by the special pleas of autrefois acquit
and autrefois convict but are also codified in the form of double
jeopardy proscriptions.
The general attitude of the United States and Australia to-
wards guarding against multiple prosecutions can be detected by
104. South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1903, § 285 as
amended (emphasis added).
105. See Queensland Criminal Code Act of 1899, § 598(3)(4)(5), 602 as
amended; Western Australian Criminal Code Act of 1913 §H 616(3)(4)(5), 620
as amended; Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924, § 538 as amended.
106. See Queensland Criminal Code Act of 1899, § 16, 17 as amended; Tas-
manian Criminal Code Act 1924, § 11 as amended; which authorizes a second
conviction upon death of the victim only if the death occurs after the first punish-
ment. See also Western Australia Criminal Code Act 1913, § 16, which states:
A person cannot be twice punished, either under the provisions of this
Code or under the provisions of any other law, for the same act or omis-
sion, except in the case where the act or omission is such that by means
thereof it causes the death of another person, in which case he may be
convicted of the offence of which he is guilty by reason of causing such
death, notwithstanding that he has already been convicted of some other
offence constituted by the act or omission,
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examining article 8, section 8 of the United States-Australia Status
of Forces Agreement which provides:
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this Article either by the military authorities
of the United States or by the authorities of Australia and
has been acquitted, or has been convicted . . . he may not
be tried again for the same offence within Australia. How-
ever, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military
authorities of the United States from trying a member of the
United States forces for any violation of rules of discipline
arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence
for which he was tried by the authorities of Australia. 1'07
While realizing that procedure differs between civilian and
military courts, it would appear that the Australian government
firmly believes in determining the outcome of an issue in a single
trial. This procedure is adhered to regardless of the outcome in
the first trial. Unlike the Australian government, the United States
reserves the right to reprosecute. Although a second prosecution by
a different country is distinguishable from successive prosecutions
within a federal system, it does reflect a general tolerance by the
United States government to condone successive prosecutions.
The Australian government's respect for the rights of a crim-
inal defendant is exemplified by its reluctance to subject a de-
fendant to a second trial for the same offense. By affording a
defendant the opportunity to plead autrejois acquit and autre-
lois convict, the protection against double jeopardy, not ade-
quately safeguarded in the United States and Canada, is strongly
established in Australia.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The North-American authority in support of permitting suc-
cessive multi-governmental prosecutions has been severely eroded
by recent decisions. 08 The archaic common law concept of em-
phasizing the locus of the act to determine jurisdiction is imprac-
tical and unnecessary in a federal system. Multiple prosecutions
are not required to insure the representation of disparate govern-
107. Status of United States Forces in Australia, May 9, 1963, [1964] 14
U.S.T., T.I.A.S. 5349.
108. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'ns of N.Y. Harbor, 387 U.S. 52 (1964); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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mental interests, for the primary issue involved, guilt or innocence,
could be determined in a single trial. Additionally, it is difficult to
find constitutional support for permitting a second trial, and the
decision in Benton v. Maryland casts considerable doubt upon
the legal basis for allowing such successive prosecutions. 10 9 Nev-
ertheless, the United States and Canada continue to permit the
state, province, and federal governments to do jointly that which
neither can do alone; namely, to reprosecute in furtherance of ob-
taining a conviction. 110
It is imperative that the United States and Canada examine
the system employed in Australia in order to focus upon the proper
direction to pursue in alleviating this problem. However, they
must first be cognizant of the motivation behind guaranteeing
individuals double jeopardy protection. It was originated to
prevent the prosecution from subjecting a defendant to the hard-
ship of a second trial.'11 The need to conduct a second trial for
the same offense is heavily outweighed by the effect it has on the
defendant.
The United States policy remains consistent with the purpose
of preventing multiple prosecutions by disallowing successive state
or federal trials.' 12  However, allowing successive state-federal,
or federal-state prosecutions is inconsistent with this purpose.
Double jeopardy protection becomes meaningless if a defendant
must face the burden of two trials merely because the prosecu-
tion is conducted by a different government. To the defendant,
it is immaterial whether his constitutional right against double
jeopardy has been invaded by a state or federal -trial. If Justice
Harlan is correct in his assertion that, "[t]his Court has . . . abol-
ished the two sovereignties rule,""' 3 then the policy arguments
which support successive prosecutions by the state and federal
governments are obsolete.
However, federal-state prosecutions cannot be categorized
as repugnant to the fifth amendment. In light of this, the con-
stitutionality of multi-governmental prosecutions will remain un-
changed absent an express overruling of Bartkus v. Illinois, and
Abbate v. United States. Until these cases are denunciated, suc-
109. id.
110. See note 65, supra.
111. See authority cited note 8, supra.
112. U.S. CONST., amends. V, VIV.
113. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 250 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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cessive prosecutions will continue, limited only by -the United
States Attorney General's mandate114 or an infrequent decision
by a federal district court.' 15
Proponents of successive prosecutions argue in favor of per-
mitting a second trial to prevent an inadequate prosecution from
precluding the possibility of obtaining a conviction."' If a sec-
ond trial is barred, a defendant might avoid punishment entirely.
If a second prosecution was disallowed, the situation may result
in a "race 'to the courthouse" by the state and federal prosecu-
tors.117  This situation could be remedied by enacting legislation
which would either vest jurisdiction in the federal court or provide
the federal government with the election to initiate prosecution.
8
These alternatives would vest more prosecutorial control in the
federal government, but this may .be an unavoidable conse-
quence. Justice Brennan reasons 'that stricter enforcement of
fundamental rights inevitably results in the readjustment of the
federal-state relationship, and a diminution of state power." l9
Public policy also operates against multiple prosecution.
The double jeopardy guarantee represents fairness and protection
for the defendant. A second prosecution results in harassment
of the accused and unfair advantage to the prosecutor. i 0 "The
mere necessity of defending successive prosecutions and the time,
trouble and mental anxiety associated with such an endeavor is
sufficient to show harassment without more."'' In addition,
conducting a second defense is expensive and if bond is not
114. Note 59, supra.
115. See State v. Fletcher, 15 Ohio Misc. 336, 240 N.E. 2d 905 (1968).
116. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). A further considera-
tion for allowing successive prosecutions stems from the fear that administration
of justice may be impaired if a second trial is prohibited. Offsetting that consid-
eration is the importance of the individual's right to be free from double prosecu-
tion. Many American courts resolve the dilemma of successive prosecutions by
permitting a second trial but avoid its harsh effects, through use of nominal penal-
ties or concurrent sentences. See Comment, Successive Prosecutions by State and
Federal Governments for Offenses Arising Out of Same Act, 44 MINN. L. REv.
534, 540 (1960).
117. Brant, Overruling Bartkus and Abbate: A New Standard for Double
Jeopardy, 11 WASH. L.J. 188, 201 (1972).
118. See comment, Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal Govern-
ments for Offenses Arising Out of Same Acts, 44 MINN. L. REv. 534, 540 (1960).
119. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 945, 956
(1964).
120. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
121. Multiple Prosecution, supra note 14, at 361.
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posted, the defendant may serve months in jail pending trial.
The hardships of a second trial rest solely on the defendant.
Finally, there may be adverse societal effects which result
from a second prosecution. Punishment for crime serves a num-
ber of purposes, one of which is preparing the offender to return
to society to take up a normal, law abiding role. However, a re-
leased prisoner often has his -travel rigidly controlled and his em-
ployment opportunities restricted. Being subjected to a second
trial engenders hostility. It increases, rather than diminishes, his
feeling of alientation from the community and "sabotages objec-
tives of probation and parole." '122
Canada and the United States should revise their double
jeopardy policies. A workable adjustment between the compet-
ing claims of .the province or state and the federal government
may be achieved without successive prosecutions. In the spirit of
individual rights, new legislation is needed. The American and
Canadian legislators should consider the measures used to pro-
hibit successive prosecutions in Australia. The Australian system
results in justice to the defendant and a representative prosecu-
tion by the two sovereignties.
The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois con-
vict should become an integral part of the United States and Ca-
nadian double jeopardy policies. Had these pleas been utilized
in Bartkus, Abbate and Gauvin, the results may have been differ-
ent. All three men were prosecuted and retried for the same of-
fense by an independent sovereignty. If the trials had been in
an Australian Court, Bartkus could have plead autrefois acquit
and Abbate and Gauvin autrefois convict. If the court then found
that the second trial was for the same offense, the pleas may
have barred the second prosecution.
The courts and legislature will better serve the people by
abandoning mechanical and archaic applications of the dual sov-
ereignty principles. By de-emphasizing the locus of -the act, and
re-emphasizing the individual rights of the citizens, results such as
occurred in Bartkus, Abbate, and Gauvin may be avoided. Cer-
tainly if the United States Constitution forbids successive prose-
cutions by the same government, a fortiori, it should do so when
the former judgment was obtained in a court that represents a
122. See D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
(1959).
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similar governmental interest. Justice Black summarized the
problem when he aptly stated:
Ultimately the Court's reliance on federalism amounts
to no more than the notion that, somehow, one act becomes
two because two jurisdictions are involved. [One author]
. . . long ago disposed of a similar contention made to justify
two trials for the same offense by different counties as "a
mere Fiction or Construction of Law, which shall hardly take
Place against a Maxim made in Favour of Life." It was
discarded as a dangerous fiction then, it should be discharged
as a dangerous fiction now.
12 3
Jeffrey S. Raynes
123. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 158 (1959) (Black, J. dissenting).
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